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Federal Court Strikes Down

Nebraska Corporate Farming Law

-by Roger A. McEowen* and Neil E. Harl** 
In late 2005, the Federal District Court for the District of Nebraska held, in Jones, et al. 
v. Gale, et al.,1 that the Nebraska Constitutional provision restricting unauthorized corporate 
involvement in certain types of agricultural activities2 is unconstitutional on “dormant commerce 
clause” grounds and on the basis that the provision violates the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA).3 The Nebraska Attorney General is appealing the ruling to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which has ruled twice on anti-corporate farming restrictions 
in other states in recent years.4 The case represents the most recent judicial pronouncement 
concerning the ability of a particular state’s citizenry to shape the future structure of agriculture 
within that state. 
Overview – Anti-Corporate Farming Restrictions. Presently, nine states prohibit 
corporations from engaging in agriculture to various degrees.5 The restrictions grew out of 
rising concern across the country that several key sectors of the U.S. economy were becoming 
controlled by a few large firms and multi-state corporations.6 While the laws are not designed 
to slow down or prevent structural change in agriculture, they are designed to control the 
organizational form of farming operations based on ownership arrangements. Until recently, 
no appellate-level court at either the state or federal levels had ever held a state anti-corporate 
farming law unconstitutional.7 
Initiative 300. The Nebraska anti-corporate farming law (I-300) was added to the state 
Constitution in 1982 by voters through the initiative and referendum process. The law prohibits 
a corporation or syndicate from acquiring or obtaining an interest in any title to real estate used 
for farming or ranching in Nebraska, or from engaging in farming or ranching in the state. 
A syndicate is defined as a limited partnership other than a limited partnership in which the 
partners are members of a family or a trust created for the benefit of a member of the family, 
related to one another within the fourth degree of kindred (first cousins) or their spouses, at 
least one of whom is a person residing on or actively engaged in the day-to-day labor and 
management of the farm or ranch. Numerous exceptions exist, but the major one is for family 
farm or ranch corporations (defined as a majority of the voting stock held by members of the 
family) or a trust created for the benefit of a member of the family. The majority shareholders 
must be related to each other within the fourth degree of kindred (or be the spouse of a family 
member), and at least one family member must either reside on the farm or be actively engaged 
in the day-to-day labor and management of the farm.8 
Jones, et al. v. Gale, et al.9 The plaintiffs were engaged in agricultural activities to a certain 
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degree. They all claimed that I-300 barred their proposed activities 
and challenged the law on the basis that it violated the “dormant 
commerce clause,” the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Two of the 
plaintiffs were disabled and claimed that I-300 also violated the 
ADA10 because of the requirement that at least one family member 
be “a person residing on or actively engaged in the day to day labor 
and management of the farm or ranch.” 
The “Dormant Commerce Clause.” The Commerce Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution11 forbids discrimination against commerce, 
which repeatedly has been held to mean that state and localities 
may not discriminate against the transactions of out-of-state actors 
in interstate markets even when the Congress has not legislated 
on the subject.12 The overriding rationale of the commerce clause 
was to create and foster the development of a common market 
among the states and to eradicate internal trade barriers. Thus, 
a state may not enact rules or regulations requiring out-of–state 
commerce to be conducted according to the enacting state’s terms.13 
So, states have the power to regulate economic activity within 
their borders, but cannot do so in a discriminatory manner. If the 
state has been motivated by a discriminatory purpose, the state 
bears the burden to show that it is pursuing a legitimate purpose 
that cannot be achieved with a nondiscriminatory alternative.14 
However, if the state regulates without a discriminatory purpose 
but with a legitimate purpose, the provision will be upheld unless 
the burden on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to 
the benefits that the state derives from the regulation.15 In essence, 
a state is free to regulate economic transactions occurring within its 
borders in the manner it deems appropriate as long as it is done in 
a nondiscriminatory fashion, but is not free to regulate economic 
conduct occurring elsewhere.16 
The court’s “dormant commerce clause” analysis. The 
court held that I-300 was facially discriminatory because it “was 
conceived and born in protectionist fervor,” and that the ballot 
title and language of I-300 clearly indicated that Nebraskans 
would be given “favored treatment” on the basis that it would be 
more economically feasible for those living in close proximity to 
Nebraska farm and ranches to provide “day-to-day physical labor 
and management.” As such, the court continued down the path 
established by the Eighth Circuit in two earlier cases involving 
anti-corporate farming laws from South Dakota and Iowa, where 
the court did not examine the actual impact on economic conduct 
by in-state and out-of-state firms, instead relying on statements of 
legislators and ballot titles to find discrimination against interstate 
commerce.17 But, the court appeared to go even further when 
it stated, “When it is apparent from the language of a …state 
constitutional amendment…that its effect is to burden out-of state 
economic interests and benefit in-state economic interests, the 
party challenging it should not be required to bear the burden of 
an evidentiary hearing to prove the obvious” [emphasis added]. 
Unfortunately, the court did not provide any explanation as to how 
the text of I-300, by itself, can have a discriminatory impact on 
interstate commerce. While the court was correct to examine the 
text of I-300, the text clearly applies to any corporation or syndicate 
“organized under the laws of any state of the United States.” The 
provision does not provide preferential treatment for Nebraska firms 
as compared to out-of-state firms. All firms wishing to engage in 
agricultural activities in Nebraska are subject to an identical set of 
rules, as far as I-300 is concerned. Consequently, an appropriate 
question is whether I-300 burdens interstate commerce excessively 
in relation to the benefits that the state derives from I-300.18 That is 
not likely to be the case, particularly since I-300 does not contain 
any prohibition against agricultural contracting activities.19 
The court also found a discriminatory effect associated 
with the requirement that a family member provide (as the court 
referred to it) “day-to-day physical labor and management.” The 
actual language of I-300 requires that a family member of a qualified 
entity be a “person residing on or actively engaged in the day-to-day 
labor and management of the farm or ranch…” The test is one of 
active engagement and not, as the court put it, the provision of “day-
to-day physical labor and management.” While the court relied on 
Hall v. Progress Pig, Inc.,20 for its reasoning, that case involved the 
construction of the terms “labor” and “management” and did not 
directly address the question of the meaning of “active engagement” 
in the context of the provision of labor and management. There is 
authority for the notion that “active engagement” requires much 
less than actually rendering labor and management on the premises. 
For example, under USDA payment limitation rules, one of the 
requirements that a farmer (or otherwise eligible entity) must 
satisfy to be eligible for federal farm program payments is the 
active engagement test.21 As part of the active engagement test, the 
individual (or entity) must make a significant contribution of active 
personal labor or active personal management (or a combination 
thereof).22 While hired services do not count,23 it is clear that active 
personal management need not be performed on the farm to satisfy 
the test – a person can contribute active personal management while 
living in a distant town.24 Active engagement in labor activities can 
be achieved via contract. In any event, under I-300, the mere fact 
that the shareholder resides on the farm negates the requirement 
that the shareholder be actively engaged in the day to day labor 
and management of the farm.
The ADA Claim. The Court also found that I-300 was invalid 
under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause because it conflicted 
with the ADA on the basis that two of the plaintiffs were disabled 
and could not perform the daily physical labor that the court believed 
I-300 required. The ADA provides that “no qualified individual 
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded 
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be discriminated by 
any such entity.”25 While the court noted that “public entity” has 
been construed broadly to apply to all actions of state and local 
governments, the court did not address the point that I-300 did not 
involve the action of a governmental body. Instead, I-300 was the 
result of the initiative and referendum process and was approved 
by Nebraska voters.26 No action or activity of government was 
involved. The court also did not address the applicability of the 
ADA to Nebraska farming operations. The ADA only applies to 
“employers” that have 15 or more employees for each working day 
in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding 
calendar year.27 
Conclusion. The court’s opinion appears to be seriously flawed 
in several respects. However, it is questionable whether the opinion 
will be reversed on appeal. Except for its opinion in Hampton,28 the 
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Eighth Circuit has not shown much willingness to analyze deeply 
the dormant commerce clause issue. If the decision stands, it will 
have a dampening effect on a state’s efforts to ensure competitive 
markets for agricultural products and a level playing field for 
independent agricultural producers. Increased pressure could also 
be placed on the Congress to address the anti-competitive effects 
of concentrated agricultural markets and vertically integrated 
agricultural production supply chains.
Footnotes 
1 No. 8:04-CV645, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35361 (D. Neb. Dec. 15, 
2005).
2 The Nebraska provision is contained in Article XII, Section 8 of the 
Nebraska Constitution. 
3 The court did rule, however, that the Nebraska provision did not violate 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution. 
4 See South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. et al. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583 
(8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied., 541 U.S. 1037 (2004); Smithfield Foods, Inc. 
v. Miller, 367 F.3d 1061 (8th Cir. 2004), vac’g. and rem’g., 241 F. Supp. 
2d 978 (S.D. Iowa 2003).
5 The states are Iowa (Iowa Code § 9H.1 et seq.); Kansas (Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 17-5901 et seq.); Minnesota (Minn. Stat. Ann. § 500.24 et seq.);
Missouri (Mo. Ann. Stat. § 350.15); Nebraska (Neb. Const. Art. XII, § 
8(1)); North Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code § 10-06.1-02); Oklahoma (Okla. 
Const. Ar. XXII, 2); South Dakota (S.D. Codified Laws § 47-9A-3); and 
Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. Ann. § 182.001).
6 These concerns resulted in passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, the 
Clayton Act in 1914, the Packers and Stockyards Act in 1921 and the 
Robinson-Patman Act in 1936. The basic idea of federal intervention in the 
marketplace was to maintain competition and protect small, independent 
businesses against unfair competition from vertically integrated, multi-
location chain stores. 
7 See, e.g., Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207 (1945), 
aff’g, 16 N.W.2d 523 (N.D. 1944) (upholding North Dakota provision 
against alleged violations of equal protection, due process, privileges and 
immunities, and contract clauses of Constitution); State ex rel. Webster v. 
Lehndorff Geneva, Inc., 744 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1988) (upholding Missouri 
provision against equal protection and due process challenge); Omaha 
National Bank v. Spire, 223 Neb. 209, 389 N.W.2d 269 (1986) (upholding 
Nebraska Constitutional provision against equal protection challenge)
8 A stockholder can be a corporation or partnership if all of the 
stockholders or partners are related within the fourth degree of kindred to 
the majority of stockholders in the family farm corporation.
9 No. 8:04-CV645, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35361 (D. Neb. Dec. 15, 
2005).
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. 
11 Article I, § 8, Clause 3.
12 See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (holding as 
unconstitutional city ordinance prohibiting sale of milk in city unless bottled 
at approved plant within five miles of city); Hunt v. Washington StateApple 
Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (state statute requiring all 
closed containers of apples sold or shipped into state to bear “no grade other 
than applicable U.S. grade or standard” held unconstitutional discrimination 
against commerce).
13 See, e.g., American Meat Institute, et al. v. Barnett, 64 F. Supp. 2d 
906 (D. S.D. 1999) (South Dakota price discrimination statute declared 
unconstitutional because it applied to livestock slaughtered in South Dakota 
regardless of where livestock purchased).
14 See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). But, the plaintiff 
bears the initial burden of proving discriminatory purpose. Id. 
15 See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)(state law 
prohibiting interstate shipment of cantaloupes not packed in compact 
arrangements in closed containers, even though furthering legitimate 
state interest, held unconstitutional due to substantial burden on interstate 
commerce).
16 See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (court 
struck down statute requiring milk purchased out-of-state to not be sold in 
New York unless out-of-state producers had received New York minimum 
price); but see Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (court upheld 
New York law setting minimum prices paid to milk producers, as applied 
to purchases by New York retailers from New York producers).
17 South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. et al. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583 (8th 
Cir. 2003), cert. denied., 541 U.S. 1037 (2004); Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. 
Miller, 367 F.3d 1061 (8th Cir. 2004), vac’g. and rem’g., 241 F. Supp. 2d 
978 (S.D. Iowa 2003).
18 In Hampton Feedlot, et al. v. Nixon, 249 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2001), the 
court upheld against a dormant commerce clause challenge provisions of 
the Missouri Livestock Marketing Law which barred livestock packers 
purchasing livestock in Missouri from discriminating against producers 
in purchasing livestock except for reasons of quality, transportation costs 
or special delivery times. The court noted that the Missouri statute only 
regulated livestock sold in Missouri and was indifferent to livestock sales 
occurring outside Missouri and had no chilling effect on interstate commerce 
because packers could easily purchase livestock other than in Missouri to 
avoid the Missouri provision. In addition, the court specifically opined 
that the Missouri legislature had the authority to determine the course of 
its farming economy and that the legislation was a constitutional means of 
doing so.
19 The court mistakenly stated that I-300 barred one of the plaintiffs from 
entering into contracts with out-of state firms for the raising and feeding 
of livestock. That would only be the case if, under a particular contract’s 
terms, an otherwise disqualified organization either obtains an interest 
in Nebraska real estate used for farming or is deemed to be engaged in 
farming in Nebraska. Unfortunately, the court did not provide that necessary 
analysis.
20 259 Neb 407, 610 N.W.2d 420 (2000). The Nebraska Supreme Court 
held that I-300 required the shareholder to render physical labor and 
participate directly in management of the operation.
21 7 U.S.C. § 1308-1(b).
22 7 U.S.C. § 1308-1(b)(2)(A)(i).
23 7 C.F.R. § 1400.3. 
24 Also, USDAregulations define “active personal management” to include 
the marketing and promotion of agricultural commodities produced by the 
farming operation.” 7 C.F.R. § 1400.3. That seems to indicate that “active 
personal management” can be found to be present through a crop marketing 
agreement with another farming operation. See Mages v. Johanns, No. 03-
1400, 2005 U.S.App. LEXIS 28735 (8th Cir. Dec. 27, 2005) (issue mentioned 
but not in issue; reserved for possibility of being raised on remand).
25 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Under the statute, “public entity” is defined to 
include “any State or local government; [and] any department, agency, 
special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local 
government.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)-(B).
26 The court simply referenced an earlier opinion of a different federal 
court on the same issue for the proposition that I-300 violated ADA. See 
South Dakota Farm Bureau v. Hazeltine, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (2002)(ADA
claim involving an amendment to the South Dakota anti-corporate farming 
law).
27 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) 
28 249 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2001). 
